THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AD

REVIEW.
NOVEMBER, 1892.
THE BRITISH SIDE OF THE BEHRING SEA
CONTROVERSY.
By LAwP.ENCB GODKIN, ESQ.

IT is proposed in this article to state briefly some of
the arguments which the British government may advance
in its controversy with the United States over the seal fisheries in the Biehring Sea. It will be assumed, for the purposes of this discussion, that certain facts will be proved 'or
admitted before the arbitrators, to wit: that a large amount
of capital belonging to citizens of the United States is invested in the seal fisheries of Behring Sea; that many citizens of the United States are engaged in that industry;
that the fur bearing seals inhabit the shores of Alaska, but
migrate to the Prybyloff Islands to breed, and that these
islands are owned by the United States; that British subects
have been killing female seals in breeding time in the law of
open waters of the Behring Sea surrounding the Prybyloff
I Mr. Stephen B. Stanton, in the December number, will present the
American side of the controversy. See the statement of the case by
_ECALAW
Henry Flanders, Esq. in the September issue of THn ARa
RiG1,ST4R AND Ruwinw.
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Islands, and outside of what is commonly known, in the
territorial jurisdiction, as the three-mile limit; and that the
circumstances under which these British subjects take the
seals are such as have resulted in a distinct diminution in
the number of seals in the Behring Sea, and will eventually
result in their extermination.
It is believed that the foregoing statement fairly presents the contention of the United States, in so far as these
facts are concerned, but although these facts will be considered as admitted for the purposes of this article, it should
be borne in mind that they have not been admitted, as yet
-at least without considerable qualification -by Great
Britain.
From an examination of the correspondence between
Mr. BLAINE and Lord SALISBURY, and of various writings
including Mr. PHELP'S able article in Harier's Magazine,

in which the claims of the United States have been set
forth, it would appear that, when analyzed, the present
condition of the United States, on the law, is that this
government has a right to prevent British subjects from killing seals in Behring Sea outside the three-mile limit, for
three reasons: Ist, because, owing to the habitat and habits
of the Alaskan seal, and the circumstances surrounding the
seal industry in Behring Sea, the people of the United
States have a right of property in the seals which is not
divested when they wander beyond the three-mile limit;
2d, because it is contra bonos mores for the subjects of any
nation to kill animals so useful to all nations under circumstances which threaten speedy extermination of the species;
3d, because Behring Sea is, as between Great Britain and
the United States, an open or a high sea in a qualified sense
only, for the reason that the United States took from Russia certain jurisdictional rights in this sea, which rights
had been conceded and acquiesced in by Great Britain.
These propositions will be taken up in the order in
which they have been stated, which is, in the opinion of
the writer, their order of merit, and first, therefore, let us
examine the contention that the United States has a right
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of property in the seals. It will be assumed that all seals
whose killing by British subjects it is sought to prohibit,
are seals which have been born on American soil, or which
have their habitation on American soil; for it is scarcely to
be supposed that, on the property theory at least, the United
States would claim that it has a right to prohibit the killing
of Russian seals in Behring Sea. This right might be
claimed on one of the other grounds which has been adduced, but not on the theory of property in the seal. Assuming, therefore, that all the seals which have been
killed, or which are in danger of being killed, in breeding
time by British subjects are American seals, can there be
such a right of property in wild seal roaming at large in
Behring Sea as will entitle the United States, or any
citizen thereof to prohibit the citizens of another State
from killing the seal when found without the three-mile
limit ?
Now, there is no international law, properly so called,
on the subject of property in wild aninfials, and, therefore,
we must, to a certain extent, at least, be guided to our determination by the principles and precedents of the common
and civil law, and particularly by those of the common law,
because that is the system of law which obtains in both the
contending countries.
In his letter to Sir JULIAN PAUNCEFORTE of May 22,
1890, Lord SALISBURY said:
"Fur seals are indisputably animals fer- nalzur&z, and
these have universally been regarded by jurists as res nullius until they are caught; no person, therefore, can have
property in them until he has reduced them into possession
by capture."
BLACKSTONE says that an individual may have a qual,erb
iza/ur¢
"prTzer
ified property in creatures that are
b-iz,legiwm,; that is, he may have the privilege of hunting, taking and killing them, in exclusion of other persons,
so long as they continue within his liberty; and may restrain any stranger from taking them therein; but the

THI

BRITISH SIDE OF THU

instant they depart into another liberty, this qualified property ceases.1
The only way in which one can acquire property in
wild animals is by reclaiming them. There are three ways
of reclaiming a wild animal: by killing it, and getting possession of the carcass; by getting physical control of itthat is, by getting it in such position that its movements
can be controlled-and lastly, by taming it.'
A brief review of some of the practical applications of
the above principles by the Courts of the United States
may illuminate the question. For instance, bees are not
the subject of property until actually hived, and he who
first encloses them in a hive becomes their proprietor.' And
doves are wild animals, and not the subject of larceny,
unless they are in the owner's custody, as in a dove house,
or in a nest, before they are able to fly." Fish, unless reclaimed, confined, or dead, and valuable for food, are not
considered to be property.' One who hunts a fox acquires
in it no property merely by the pursuit; and so, if arlother,
in the sight of the pursuer kills it and appropriates it to
his use, no action will lie." And in one of the United States,
at least, the common-law right to hunt for animals feraw
natur&-in the uncultivated and unenclosed grounds of another has been recognized. 7
And so, in the civil law, it is the rule that there can
be no property in wild animals unless they have been
reclaimed; and even after they have been reclaimed, the
right of property in them can be divested by their
escape, unless they are capable of identification.8 Now
it must be conceded that fur seals are fer&- na/ur&-, and
I Blackstone's

Commentaries, Book 2, Ch. 25.
2 Bishop's Criminal Law, Vol. II., sec. 775, 776.
3 Gillet v. Mason, 7 Johnson, 16.
'Commonwealth v. Chase, 9 Pick., i5.
State v. Krider, 78 N. C., 48r.
6 Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johnson, 75.
Broughton v. Singleton, 2 Nott & McCord, 338; McConico v. Singleton,
5 Mill, South Carolina, 244.
8
Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, Bk. 2, Ch. 8.
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it can scarcely be contended that the United States has
reclaimed the Alaskan seals. It is difficult, therefore, to
discover any principle or precedent of municipal law upon
which the United States can base a claim to a right of property in the Alaskan seals-at least, when they are beyond
the three-mile limit.
But it may be contended that the matter in controversy is not one to be decided by precedents, or want of
precedents, or codes, or omissions from codes in municipal
law, which confine and narrow the determination of questions of meum and tuum as between individuals; that the
case, under the circumstances under which it has arisen,
is to be decided by a higher law and broader principle.
This brings us to the consideration of the contention that
the killing of the seals is contra bonos mores. A satisfactory definition of an act which is said to be contra bonos
Ynores, as used by Mr. BLAINE, may be an act which is
contrary to some rule of conduct which is recognized by
civilized nations to be a rule of conduct for reasons of inoralilj,. The last three words of this definition are important; for an act may be contrary to some rule of conduct
which has been recognized on grounds of exbediency. The
rules which have been generally adopted by civilized comimunities prohibiting the killing of game at certain seasons
of the year, come within the latter category. We prohibit the killing of partridges in breeding time, not because
it is more immoral to kill them at that time, but because,
if it is not prohibited, we shall have fewer partridges to kill
next 3-ear. And so, it may be inexpedient to allow the
killing of female seals in breeding time, because it will result in the exteimination of the species; and, for that reason, it may be for the advantage of both nations that Great
Britain and the United States should agree upon a close
season in Behring Sea, during which the killing of seals
should be prohibited; but it is not contrary to any recognized rule of morality to kill them at that time. It is only
contrary to natural and reasonable economy. But, because
a thing has been generally prohibited for economic reasons,
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it does not follow that it is contrary to moral law, or opposed to any rule of international law.
It is true that the collection of rules for the conduct of
civilized nations, in their relations with each other, which
is called International Law, has grown up and developed
out of the necessities of civilization and fundamental principles of morality; but they are rules which have been
tacitly assented to, relied on, and applied by the great
powers for generations, until they have become an unwritten international code, whose binding force is recognized.
An example is to be found in the crime of piracy. Independent of any treaty, convention or express agreement of
any kind, it is recognized by all the nations that each nation
may seize and punish a pirate, no matter of what nation the
pirate may claim to be a citizen. But, unless a specific act
is a violation of some of the fundamental principles of morality, or has, in some way, been recognized by the great
powers as an offence against the law of nations, no nation
has the right to forcibly prevent the citizens of another
nation from the commission of that act, or punish them for
its commission, except within its own territorial jurisdiction. There the"nation is, of course, supreme. The United
States may prevent the killing of seals in breeding time
within the three-mile limit, just as it may prevent the killing of buffalo in the United States; but, outside of the
three-mile limit, it may not, unless the killing of animals
fer-e natura-under such circumstances is contrary to some
moral law recognized by Great Britain and the United
States, or is a recognized offence against the unwritten
code of international law, or unless the nations have expressly covenanted and agreed that this act shall be considered unlawful; and, even in the latter case, only such
nations as have entered into the covenant or agreement are
bound by its terms.
An illustration and example of international law established and binding only by convention or assent of the parties, may be found in the instances cited by Mr. BLAINE,
of the assumption by Great Britain of jurisdiction of the
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high seas beyond the three-mile limit. Mr. BLAINE pointed
out, for instance, in his letter of December, 17, 189o, to Sir
JULIAN PAUNCEFORTE, .that, in 1816, while the first NAPOLEON was a captive on the island of St. Helena, Great
Britain passed a statute forbidding the ships of any nationality to hover within eight leagues of the coast of that island. By the Treaty of Paris in 1815, the governments of
'Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia had agreed that
Great Britain should be the custodian of NAPOLEON. But
assume that an attempt had been made by Great Britain to
seize a ship of any other nation, not a party to the Treaty
of Paris, as, 'for instance, a ship of.the United States, for a
violation of this hovering Act, it is reasonable to suppose
that the British government would have at once disavowed
the Act, and the ship would have been released, for the reason that the offence of hovering within eight leagues of the
coast of St. Helena was not an offence against the recognized law of nations, but, at the utmost, was only a violation of the Treaty of Paris, which was binding only upon
the parties who assented to it. It is reasonable to suppose
this, because such was the principle applied by Lord STOWELL in the case of "Le Louis." 1 "Le Louis" was a
French ship employed in the slave trade. She was seized
by an English armed vessel off the coast of Africa. Lord
STOWELL ordered her release upon the ground that the
British Slave Trade Act could not affect the rights or interests of foreigners, unless it was founded upon the principles,
and imposed regulations, that were consistent with the law
of nations. He pointed out that trading in slaves, though
generally recognized to be wicked, and though forbidden
by the British Parliament, was not forbidden by the law of
nations; nor had France, though disapproving of the slave
trade, ever allowed that the offence of trading in slaves by
French subjects should be cognizable by any authorities
except their own. Lord STOWELL'S language is pertinent
here.
"But," he said, "a nation is not justified in assuming
12

Dodson,

211.
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rights that do not belong to her, merely because she intends
to apply them to a laudable purpose; nor in setting out
upon a minor crusade of converting other nations by Acts
of unlawful force."
And so of the other illustrations, adduced by Mr.
BLAINE, of jurisdiction outside the three-mile limit assumed
by Act of the British Parliament. Grant, if you likewhat is, however, not the case-that all such Acts were so
worded as to be intended to affect the citizens of other
nations than Great Britain, still they would be null and
void as against such foreign nations, unless assented to by
them or unless in conformity with the law of nations. The
killing of seals in breeding time is not, any more than the
slave trade was, an offence against the recognized law of
nations, and no Act of Congress of the United States or
claim of that government can nlake it an offence against
the law of nations in so far as any other government is
concerned, unless such other government acquiesce in that
proposition.
Hence it would seem that the Government of the
United States has no right to protect the seals by prohibiting their killing outside the three-mile limit, unless there
is some other claim of jurisdiction than that derived from
the general principles of international law. And this
brings us to the consideration of what jurisdictional rights
the United States has in Behring Sea by treaty or assent
of Russia or Great Britain. It is impossible within the
space allowed for this article to do full jtistice to this branch
of the subject. It involves a discussion of maps which
cannot be reproduced here, but the main proposition contended for by the United States may be answered thus. By
an imperial ukase of the Emperor Alexander, issued in
182I, Russia claimed exclusive jurisdiction of a marginal
belt of Behring Sea, extending one hundred Italian miles
from the shore. This claim was resisted by the United
States.' *The result was the Treaty of 1824 between the
United States and Russia, by which it was provided that

I Letter from J. Q. Adams to Mr. Poletica,

March 3o,1822.
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the respective citizens and subjects of the United States and
Russia " shall be neither disturbed nor restrained, either in
navigation or fishing' in any part " of the great ocean
commonly called the Pacific Ocean or South Sea." By a
treaty between Russia and Great Britain, concluded in 1825,
it was provided "that the respective subjects of the high
contracting parties shall not be troubled or molested in any
part of the ocean commonly called the Pacific Ocean, either
in navigating the same, in fishing therein," etc.
Itwill be observed that both of these treaties were entered into with the view of determining the jurisdiction of
Russia in the Behring Sea, and that they were entered into
after both the United States and Great Britain had expostulated against the ukase before mentioned. Mr. BLAINE
contends that neither the words " the great ocean commonly
called the Pacific Ocean or the South Sea," in the Treaty
with the United States, nor the words " the ocean coinmonly called the Pacific Ocean" in the Treaty with Great
Britain, was intended to include the Behring Sea; and in
his letter to Sir JULIAN PAUNCEFORTE, of December 17,
189o, Mr. BLAINE says:
"If Great Britain can maintain her position that the
Behring Sea at the time of the treaties with Russia of 1824
and I825 was included in the Pacific Ocean, the Government
of the United States has no well grounded complaint against
her.
The reasons why it would seem that the Behring Sea,
at the time of these treaties, was intended to be included in
the Pacific Ocean is that, in the first place, the dispute to
settle which the treaties were made, was in part, in relation
to the jurisdiction claimed by Russia over Behring Sea; and,
in the second place, because in his statement to Mr. MIDDLETON, in his letter of July 22, 1823, Mr. ADAMS uses the
following clause:
"From the tenor of the ukase, the pretensions of the
Imperial government extend to an exclusive territorial
jurisdiction from the forty-fifth degree of north latitude on
the Asiatic coast to the latitude of fifty-one degrees north on
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the western coast of the American continent; and they
assume the right of interdicting the navigation and the
fishery of all other nations to the extent of one hundred
miles from the whole of that coast. The United States can
admit no part of these claims."
And, as Lord SALISBURY expressed it in his letter to
Sir JULIAN PAuNmEFORTE, of August 2, 189o, in order to
infer that the United States did not intend to include Behring Sea in its denial of Russia's claim of jurisdiction, we
would have to conclude "that, when Mr ADAms used these
clear and forcible expressions, he did not mean what he
seemed to say; that, when he stated that the United States
could admit no part of these claims, he meant that they
admitted all that part of them which related to the coast
north of the Aleutian Islands."
By the fourth article of the Treaty between the United
States and Russia, it was provided that "during a term of
ten years, counting from the signature of the present convention, the ships of both powers on which belong to their
citizens or subjects, respectively, may reciprocally frequent,
without any hindrance whatever, the interior seas, gulfs,
harbors and creeks upon the coast mentioned in the preceding article for the purpose of fishing and trading with the
natives of the country."
Thereafter, the term of ten years
mentioned in Article 4 having expired, the question arose
between the United States and Russia as to whether the
expiration of that period of time did or did not affect the
right granted by Article i of the treaty, to frequent the
coasts of Behring Sea. This question was never settled,
-and Russia refused to comply with the request of the
United States to renew Article 4 of the treaty.
Such were the rights of Russia and the United States
respectively when Alaska was ceded to the United States
in 1867. By the treaty of cession of 1867, all the rights
and privileges which Russia had in Behring Sea passed to
the United States; and if, as would appear to be the case,
Russia never had a jurisdictional right extending to one
hundred Italian miles of the coast of Behring Sea, the

